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American income-tax law, it has often been said, boils down to two 
big questions:  character and timing.  Do away with capital gains 
preferences and limitations on the utility of capital losses, and the 
numbingly complex Internal Revenue Code provisions aimed at preventing 
manipulation of character rules could disappear.  Doing so might not be a 
good idea for other reasons—even if there were no capital gains preference, 
it might still be desirable to have rules disfavoring recognition of capital 
losses1—but one unquestionable benefit of jettisoning the whole structure 
would be simplification. 
In contrast, it’s impossible to imagine how timing issues can ever 
disappear from an income-tax system.  Obviously they should be 
minimized—all contentious issues should be minimized—but questions 
about when income should be recognized and when deductions should be 
permitted will be with us until the end of time.2  And here too simplification 
could come at a cost.  The tension between the desire for technical precision 
in timing rules and the desire for simplification of the tax law can’t be 
eliminated:  simpler tax laws almost inevitably mean that more abuses will 
be tolerated.3  Sometimes trading off simplification for abuse-prevention is 
 
 * David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
 1. That prevents using the realization rules to cherrypick losses.  If capital losses 
could be used to offset ordinary income without limitation, the assumption is that taxpayers 
would disproportionately recognize losses while holding on to appreciated assets to defer 
gain recognition. 
 2. Or until the end of the income tax, whichever comes first. 
 3. For example, the original issue discount rules had to be enacted to ensure that what 
is interest economically would be treated as such for tax purposes, and to make sure that 
issuers and holders of obligations with OID had symmetrical treatment.  See I.R.C. §§ 1271–
1275, 163(e) (2010).  But the rules were simpler before enactment of these provisions.  I say 
that simpler rules “almost inevitably” mean that more abuse will be accepted because there 
is something to the argument that, if statutes (and regulations) become too detailed, and if, as 
a result, it becomes excessively costly to try to comply with them, excessive detail can 
2010] TIMIG OF ICOME RECOGITIO 263 
worth it, sometimes it’s not. 
Moshe Shekel has produced a prodigious piece of work on timing, 
the result of a major research project.  Shekel is a partner in an Israeli law 
firm that he founded and is also a lecturer at Tel Aviv University.  Few 
American practitioners, even in down economic times, can afford the time 
to write a comprehensive, comparative study, systematically pulling 
together the doctrine and the controversies about doctrine in three 
sophisticated jurisdictions—the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Israel.  (It’s hard enough for us American lawyers to get a grasp on and 
critique American doctrine.)  But that comprehensive, comparative work is 
exactly what Shekel has given us. 
This is not a treatise, if by treatise you mean a systematic 
exposition of the technical rules in a format that will help a young associate 
trying to determine what the law of Israel or the U.K. is on a particular 
question.4  Shekel will inform you of the relevant timing rules along the 
way in his comparative work, but producing a hornbook wasn’t his goal.  
This is a scholarly work about policy issues associated with timing 
questions—a great thing to have done, but not everyone’s cup of tea. 
Many American tax professionals might be skeptical about the 
value of such a work.  Why should a practitioner care what Shekel has to 
say about timing issues in taxation around the globe?  In particular, why 
should a practitioner care about policy discussions in other jurisdictions?  
Sure, in working on a particular transaction, she might need to know the 
rules in the U.K., but why should she want to go beyond that? 
American practitioners should care for several reasons.  For one 
thing, the time value of money knows no national boundaries.  Second, 
American lawyers, who tend to be provincial (you know who you are), can 
learn a great deal from the practices of other jurisdictions.  As I noted, the 
real value of Shekel’s book isn’t in planning transactions that cross national 
boundaries—we are often told how that is increasingly becoming the 
norm5—but it nevertheless behooves the American practitioner to know as 
much as she can about transnational taxation. 
Most important is that international sensibilities make it possible to 
improve American law.  American tax lawyers are engaged in public policy 
creation and criticism to a greater extent than their colleagues in most other 
                                                                                                                 
actually decrease compliance. 
 4. There are still some associates left, I believe. 
 5. This point might be overstated.  Despite the constant hyping of globalization, I’m 
regularly struck by how many American tax lawyers have practices that include very little 
work with transnational implications.  Still, understanding other countries’ tax rules clearly 
helps many American lawyers. 
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legal disciplines in the U.S.—the relative public-spiritedness (and maybe 
even heroism?6) of the American tax bar has often been noted7—and 
learning derived from the experience of other countries can inform policy 
discussions in the U.S. 
Indeed, the United States would be crazy not to look at what other 
countries are doing with timing issues.  Very smart folks elsewhere are 
thinking about very difficult topics that are conceptually similar, and 
sometimes identical, to their American counterparts.  Even those who are 
skeptical about importing ideas from other countries to interpret legal 
documents like the Constitution and the Internal Revenue Code should see 
nothing wrong with Congress’s looking at the way other countries handle 
specific tax issues.  If Congress enacts into law a principle derived from the 
U.K., the most Americentric among us has to treat that enactment as the 
law.  Or if Congress uses policy discussions from Israel to inform its own 
understanding of issues, even if it ultimately rejects the learning from 
abroad, what is there to complain about? 
To be sure, in looking to the laws of other nations, we need to be 
sensitive to political differences that might make importation of certain 
doctrines unworkable.  For example, U.K. tax law is much more formalistic 
than its U.S. counterpart—styles of dress similarly differ—and American 
lawyers brandishing their substance-over-form knowledge are inclined to 
look down on formalism.  (How, I’ve often heard it said, can a reasonable 
person not give primacy to the substance of a transaction?8)  But formalism, 
as British academic John Tiley has taught us in his critical review of U.S. 
substance-over-form doctrine, actually has a lot to be said for it.9  And, 
 
 6. See Erik M. Jensen, Aside, The Heroic ature of Tax Lawyers, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
367 (1991) (discussing JOHN GRISHAM, THE FIRM), reprinted in 54 TAX NOTES 1557 (1992).  
I have it on good authority, however, that the title of this piece might not have been intended 
to be taken literally. 
 7. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 48, 
58–59 (1988) (noting role of tax bar in fighting to create a clean Internal Revenue Code); 
Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 258, 274 
(1990) (noting that the “tax bar . . . often has pushed for reforms of the tax code against the 
interests of many of its corporate clients”).  But see David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax Bar, 
59 TAX L. REV. 331, 369–70 (2006) (arguing that tax advisors have an incentive to do no 
more than the minimum to avoid penalties, and, indeed, “the tax bar is highly motivated to 
undermine the effectiveness of [the disclosure] effort” through, for example, interpreting 
“reportable transaction” hypertechnically and burying the government in paper). 
 8. The controlling doctrine in U.S. tax law, however, is not that substance always 
controls over form.  It is that substance controls unless form does. See BORIS I. BITTKER & 
LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3.3 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 9. See John Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines:  The US Alternatives, 1987 
BRIT. TAX REV. 180; John Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines:  Some Problem Areas, 
1988 BRIT. TAX REV. 63; John Tiley, Judicial Anti-avoidance Doctrines:  Corporations and 
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even if we ultimately come out on the side of a relatively substance-driven 
system, we should know the benefits of a more formalistic one.10 
Timing issues, the subject of Shekel’s book, might initially seem to 
have little potential for chauvinistic exhibitions, but they can creep in.  
Although he understands quite well that financial accounting and tax 
accounting serve different purposes,11 one of Shekel’s ultimate arguments is 
that tax systems should adhere, as much as possible, to generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP):   
 
[A]lthough following GAAP with regard to the timing 
recognition of income and liabilities for tax purposes may 
result in some untaxed economic advantages in 
contradiction of tax values, attempts to prevent such 
untaxed economic advantages by deviating from GAAP 
and transforming “liabilities” into “income” using tax 
accounting (created in ad hoc rulings of the courts) might 
violate other tax values.12 
 
                                                                                                                 
Conclusions, 1988 BRIT. TAX REV. 108. 
 10. We should also understand how differences between political systems might make 
formalism more workable in one system than another.  A parliamentary majority can act 
relatively quickly to change formal rules to deal with newly discovered abuses.  One reason 
that extra-statutory, anti-abuse doctrines developed in the U.S. is that Congress can be slow 
to react.  When a new form of abusive tax behavior is discovered, judges are forced to 
wonder, in effect, whether Congress would have blessed particular behavior that seems to 
comport with statutory requirements, but that gives rise to results that are too good to be 
true.  For the last decade or so, Congress had considered codifying an economic substance 
doctrine, to give one judicially created anti-avoidance doctrine a statutory boost, and 
codification finally occurred in the recent healthcare legislation.  See Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 152 (replacing 
the former I.R.C. § 7701(o), now appearing as I.R.C. § 7701(p) (as amended in 2010), with a 
new provision entitled “Clarification of Economic Substance Doctrine,” generally effective 
for transactions entered into after the date of enactment).  Resistance to codification had 
come in part from those fearful that codification might limit the flexibility, and therefore the 
utility, of the doctrine.  See Erik M. Jensen, The US Legislative and Regulatory Approach to 
Tax Avoidance, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON REVENUE LAW:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
JOHN TILEY 99, 114 (John Avery Jones et al. eds., 2008).  As it is, Congress defined 
“economic substance doctrine” by reference to the common law, see I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) 
(as amended in 2010), but “clarified” the doctrine by requiring that both a meaningful 
change in the taxpayer’s economic position and a substantial non-tax purpose exist for “any 
transaction to which the . . . doctrine is relevant.”  I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (as amended in 2010). 
 11. See Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 522 (1979) (describing the different 
purposes of financial and tax accounting in concluding that, just because a write-down in the 
value of inventory might be appropriate for financial accounting purposes, it is not 
permissible under the income-tax system until a realization event has occurred). 
 12. SHEKEL at xxxiv. 
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But—here’s the chauvinism—GAAP rules are not the same 
throughout the world.  Shekel has to distinguish (as must we) between US-
GAAP and IAS (International Accounting Standard) GAAP.  Although the 
United States is fighting a rearguard action on this one—the international 
market will inevitably force U.S. accounting principles to follow 
international norms—the U.S. has been resistant.  We don’t generally 
accept the generally acceptable, as proponents of the metric system know. 
You’ve waited long enough and here—finally!—are some 
examples of the substantive issues Shekel addresses:  such things as the 
timing of recognition of income from deposits and advances—an accrual-
basis taxpayer gets something but might not be permitted to keep it—and 
the timing of deduction for future expenses.13  How and when should a 
taxpayer take into account an obligation that will be satisfied only in the 
future? 
On these timing issues, Shekel focuses on what he calls the 
Collection Question and the Quantification Question—that is, questions of 
when and how much.14  Assume accrual-basis taxpayer A with a calendar-
year taxable year has earned income according to GAAP rules on April 1, 
2010, but is not actually to receive payment until April 1 of the following 
year—and then with no provision for interest to take account of the passage 
of time.  A clearly has income at some point.  But when and in what 
amount? 
Requiring A to recognize the entire amount yet to be received on 
April 1, 2010, would overstate his income in real terms:  the present value 
on April 1, 2010, of $1000 to be received in a year is less than $1000.  
Furthermore, because the two times straddle the end of a taxable year, the 
tax liability on the amount earned, if it has to be reflected in taxable 
income, might even have to be paid before the amount is actually collected.  
Should we instead discount the amount of income in 2010 and, if so, how—
and when—do we treat the additional amount that will eventually be 
received?  Or should A not be treated as having income at all until 2011, 
even though that result would clearly be inconsistent with financial 
accounting?  Those are serious issues, addressed differently by different tax 
regimes, and with no clearly right answers.  (There are, however, clearly 
wrong ones.  For example, no one could reasonably conclude that income 
should be recognized only in 2011 in the amount of the present value 
 
 13. I have written on some of these issues, and Shekel kindly cited my work.  See, e.g., 
Erik M. Jensen, The Deduction of Future Liabilities by Accrual-Basis Taxpayers:  
Premature Accruals, the All Events Test, and Economic Performance, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 
443 (1985); Erik M. Jensen, The Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions for Accrual-
Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L. REV. 229 (1988). 
 14. SHEKEL at 1. 
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discounted to 2010.) 
The shorter the time between the two events, the less serious the 
problem, of course.  And if the time is sufficiently short, everyone would 
agree, I think, that we can safely ignore the issues altogether (except, 
perhaps, for the end-of-year straddling).  With longer time periods 
involved, however, a simple answer may make things, well, simpler, but at 
a technical cost. 
Similar questions arise from the payor’s standpoint in the above 
transaction.  Let’s assume payor B is an accrual-basis taxpayer, and the 
expense is ordinary and necessary in character.  When should the deduction 
be taken and in what amount?  For a time in the United States, it was 
thought that the controlling rule (a liability could be deducted when all 
events had occurred that fixed the obligation, and the amount could be 
determined with reasonable certainty) permitted an accrual-basis taxpayer 
to deduct the full face amount of a future obligation, regardless of when the 
obligation would be satisfied.15  An obligation to pay $1000 in twenty years 
could have generated a $1000 deduction at the time the obligation was 
incurred, a nonsensical result.  That led Professor Alan Gunn famously to 
remark that, if that in fact were the law, “well-advised accrual-method 
businesses should cancel their liability insurance and run down pedestrians 
at the rate of at least one a year.”16  Run a guy down today, deduct the full 
amount of the tort liability that might not have to be satisfied for years, and 
use the tax savings to cover the liability and a lot more.17  
Another example reflects similar questions of when and how much:  
C receives an advance or deposit that, under financial accounting standards, 
is not required to be included in income currently because it might have to 
be returned.  Income, if it is to be recognized at all, occurs when the 
recipient’s right to keep the funds becomes sufficiently clear.  C 
nevertheless has the dollars in hand and can make use of them (always 
subject to the risk of repayment, however).  U.S. doctrine generally requires 
recognition of income before GAAP would treat the amounts as financial 
income.18  That has some sense to it because of the taxpayer’s control over 
 
 15. E.g., Ohio River Collieries Co. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 1369 (1981) (permitting 
current deduction for undiscounted amount of future reclamation obligation). 
 16. Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. 
TAX REV. 1, 26 (1984). 
 17. The now generally applicable rules require that, in addition to satisfying the all-
events test, the taxpayer may take a deduction no earlier than the occurrence of “economic 
performance.”  See I.R.C. § 461(h) (2010).  Those rules often defer deductions (and can 
never accelerate them).  And economic performance for a tort liability would occur only as 
payments are made, thus deferring the deduction (and destroying Gunn’s tongue-in-cheek 
business strategy).  See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(C) (2010). 
 18. See Auto. Club of Michigan v. Comm’r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Am. Auto. Ass’n v. 
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the funds.  In that case, deferring the time of recognition would have the 
effect of understating the amount of income. 
With common fact patterns like those, a lot of dollars can be at 
stake.  Shekel concludes that none of the three countries adequately deals 
with the Collection and Quantification Questions, and he presents his own 
theoretically sophisticated proposal, the Saving of Financing Costs (SFC) 
model.  I’m not going to print it here, in part because I’d have to use a 
formula, and Greek letters make me nervous.19  Nevertheless, although I’ve 
been told that reviews aren’t supposed to tell how a book ends,20 a brief 
summary of the underpinnings of the SFC model is appropriate. 
The SFC model seeks to measure the benefits associated with the 
difference between the time of “cash flows” and the time that income or 
expense is recognized.  For example, to the extent a taxpayer is not required 
to recognize income on receipt of a deposit, but is required to return the 
deposit with adequate interest, the taxpayer has received no economic 
benefit from the arrangement.  In contrast, if the taxpayer has use of the 
deposited funds and the deposit must be returned without interest, the 
taxpayer has received a clear economic benefit, which can be measured by 
looking to comparable financing mechanisms.  A similar analysis would 
apply on the liability side:  compare the time the liability is taken into 
account with the time it must be satisfied.21  If the taxpayer benefits from 
the timing gap—again the analysis would take into account interest in 
comparable financing transactions—that benefit should be relevant for tax 
purposes.  I wouldn’t like having to explain all of this in a basic federal 
income tax class, but the model is grounded in good sense. 
In his analysis, Shekel has striven to take into account not only 
technical issues, but how the result comports with other tax values like 
equity, neutrality, certainty, efficiency, and so on.  Getting one issue “right” 
in a way that undermines other tax values is hardly a victory.  One value of 
the SFC model is that it would preserve GAAP;22 we wouldn’t have to start 
from scratch in implementing the SFC model. 
Shekel devotes substantial time to describing debates in the 
                                                                                                                 
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Schlude v. Comm’r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); see also Rev. 
Proc. 2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 991 (permitting limited deferral for advance payments in some 
circumstances).  But see Comm’r v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203 (1990) 
(not requiring utility company to treat security deposits as income). 
 19. I don’t like fraternities. 
 20. C.f. YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK:  “I REALLY DIDN’T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!” 
97 (Workman Publishing Company 1998) (the comic-book reading Yogi Berra asking his 
roommate, Bobby Brown—later Dr. Bobby Brown—how the medical text Brown was 
studying came out). 
 21. See SHEKEL at 196–97. 
 22. See id. at 196. As noted, however, GAAP isn’t universally accepted. 
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academic and professional literature, such as the debate about the matching 
principle (or the lack thereof) in American tax law.23  Some think the 
matching principle is fundamental.  Others think no “principle” is involved 
at all.  I was astonished at how familiar Shekel is with the American 
literature on timing issues, and how useful the book therefore is as a 
research resource.  (I cannot claim the same familiarity with U.K. and 
Israeli sources, but I have no reason to think he has not been equally 
punctilious in his research there.)  Those of us who feed on controversy, 
even on mundane subjects like matching, like to read about controversy. 
The Timing of Income Recognition is competently written, but at 
times the sledding is heavy.  That isn’t really a criticism.  Shekel deals with 
issues that can be made simpler, but not simple.  The reader needs to 
concentrate.  (That’s probably the case with articles elsewhere in this 
journal as well.)  And I have to admit that I did not understand all of the 
nuances of Shekel’s argument on first reading.  That’s not a criticism 
either.24  I intend to refer to the book regularly, and I expect to learn 
something each time. 
Shekel does provide more than I wanted to know about some 
accounting practices.  In most respects, that’s my problem, not his.  I 
admire those who do want to know so much.  And we certainly cannot 
ignore accounting issues in tax law.  But we do need to remember that tax 
law is not only about accounting, nor is it the province only of accountants.  
Whatever the rules are, tax advisors need to act appropriately.  
Some recent scholarship has emphasized the critical role tax 
lawyers should play as lawyers in curbing abusive behavior—not because 
anything in Circular 230, which sets out the standards professionals have to 
meet to practice before the Internal Revenue Service,25 or any other set of 
professional-responsibility rules applies, but because behaving responsibly 
and exercising good judgment are part of being a lawyer.  Professor Linda 
Beale, for example, has argued that “the basic opinion practices [of Circular 
230] (e.g., thorough consideration of law and facts, rejection of unrealistic 
assumptions) are not substantially different from that which has 
traditionally been considered good lawyering.”26  In particular, Tanina 
 
 23. See id. at 63–65. 
 24. Here’s a real criticism:  I wish Shekel, his editors, and the proofreaders had been 
more careful in avoiding typos and transcription errors.  For example, Shekel gets some 
names horribly wrong.  Michael Graetz comes out as Michael Grates in a place or two 
(although it is right elsewhere in the book).  Professor Graetz is great, of course, but he does 
not grate. 
 25. 31 C.F.R. § 10.  Rules governing practice before the IRS effectively become rules 
of tax practice more generally. 
 26. Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return:  The Case for Raising Standards 
and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 VA. TAX REV. 583, 619 (2006). 
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Rostain has argued that tax lawyers who have moved to accounting firms, 
which are technically not permitted to practice law,27 might be less inclined 
to view themselves in a professionally appropriate way.28 
That scares me.  I’m not sure it’s true, but it’s a troublesome point.  
Get too immersed in the details, get too hypertechnical in your reading of 
authority, get too focused on accounting doctrines, and you might forget the 
larger picture. 
So let’s not overdo the reliance on accounting and accountants.  But 
that’s a highfalutin point that hardly is central to what is really a fine book, 
worth dipping into again and again.  Besides, if you buy it for professional 
purposes, you should get a large deduction.29  To determine when you can 
take the deduction, however, and for what amount, you’ll need to study The 
Timing of Income Recognition first. 
 
 27. What they do, however, often looks a lot like law practice. 
 28. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers:  The Organized Bar and the Tax Shelter 
Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 120 (2006).  On a related point, Peter Canellos has 
contended that, although many shelter “professionals” have been lawyers, they have not 
adhered to standards that guide lawyers generally:  “The tax shelter professional is a 
different breed, by experience, temperament, reputation, and calling. . . . Tax shelter 
practitioners tend to be specialists rather than generalists and often suffer from the 
specialist’s lack of judgment.”  Peter C. Canellos, Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on 
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax 
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 56 (2001); see also Schizer, supra note 7 (discussing lawyerly 
failings). 
 29. I’m assuming authority exists for currently deducting a capital expenditure. 
